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ABSTRACT

This paper models the renegotiation of an international debt contract. The model is
distinguished from and extends the Bulow-Rogoff (1989a) complete-information model in that
it uses an incomplete-information sequential setting which more closely approximates the actual
bargaining situation facing countries and their creditors. The model allows a focus on the
reasons for delays in reaching agreement, highlighting the imporant role played by information
in reducing the time taken to reach agreement. It also allows a focus on the acutal process of
renegotiation, highlighting the choices faced by and the factors influencing the parties at each
step of the bargaining. This contrasts with the instantaneous arrival at agreement by completeinformation models which lack this particular dimension.

This paper is based on Chapter 4 o f my PhD thesis, "The Economics o f International Debt Renegotiation",
submitted to the Australian Graduate School o f Management, University o f New South Wales, December 1989.
For valuable comments and discussions I am grateful to Chris Adam and Bob Marks, my supervisors and also to
Malcolm Fisher, Gerald Garvey, and John Powell. I wish also to thank my examiners Jonathen Eaton, Shelagh
Heffernan and Douglas McTaggart. Finally, I thank John Roberts for first suggesting the game-theoretic
approach to me. All remaining errors are my responsibility.
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1.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In recent years, the economics literature has drawn increasingly on advances made in

bargaining/game theory to obtain insights into various aspects of the debt crisis. A problem
with many of the models in the international debt literature, which typically assume that an
indebted country chooses between the two extreme options of full debt service and total default,
is that they do not allow for the possibility of intermediate outcomes, because the traditional
tools of analysis which they employ would not permit a solution. The analysis has nothing to
say about what sorts of outcome might emerge from the bargaining. It is only recently that the
literature has begun addressing strategic issues (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981, represents a wellknown early example), and possibly the first study to adopt an explicitly bargaining-theoretic
framework to analyse the debt situation did not surface till less than five years ago (Bulow and
Rogoff, 1989a1 ).
More recent studies have addressed a variety of other topics, including issues around
reputation (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989b), the effect of bank size on the debt renegotiation process
(Fernandez and Kaaret, 1988), as well as long-standing puzzles such as why we do not
observe a debtors' cartel (Holler, 1989; Fernandez and Glazer, 1989). It has become
increasingly obvious that many aspects of the debt crisis are amenable to a bargaining-theoretic
treatment, and that the approach is capable of furnishing unique insights.
In this paper we use an extensive-form game to examine the set of actions available to
the parties as they bargain over time. Unlike Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), who use the
Rubinstein (1982) complete-information model, we adopt an incomplete-information setting.
As is well known, in a setting of complete information, it is common to find (as Bulow and
Rogoff, 1989a, do) that agreement between the parties is reached instantaneously, something
that does not accord with what we observe in practice. A feature of the debt renegotation
situation (and, indeed, of most bargaining situations) is the incompleteness of the information
available to the parties. For example, a central issue in debt renegotiations is the extent of the
Borrower's inability to service the loan on the original terms. But it is precisely information on
this which is difficult to obtain. Theoretically, information incompleteness is a cause of
bargaining inefficiency (Sobel and Takahashi, 1983; Cramton, 1984; Fudenberg, Levine and
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Tirole, 1985). This manifests itself as a delay in reaching agreement, or a complete failure to
reach agreement despite potential gains to the parties. In sequential games, in which the parties
are modelled as bargaining over time, delay in reaching agreement is a common result. The
sequential game structure therefore allows us to focus on the role that information plays in
reaching an agreement.
In typical debt renegotiation situations, the main motivating factor inducing the parties
to reach agreement is their impatience to do so. The Borrower will have had his access to
short-term funds severely restricted or cut off, and will be depleting finite stocks of foreign
exchange reserves in order to continue his conduct of essential international trade. At the same
time, the Borrower would also typically be in arrears on a significant portion of his international
debt. Because Creditor banks are often under pressure to keep their loans "current" - U.S.
banks, for example, are legally required to downgrade the status of loans that have not paid
interest within ninety days of their falling due (see Lipson, 1985) - an early resolution is also
in the interest of the banks. The equilibrium time path to agreement is therefore also of interest
to us in this paper.
The model adopted in this paper is one of one-sided incomplete information in which
only the Creditor's valuation of the loan to be bargained over is common knowledge. This
structure allows us to focus on the information-transmission aspects of the bargaining situation.
We can learn something about the way in which the equilibrium time path alters with changes
in the informational structure because the way the Borrower responds to an offer from the
Creditor conveys information to the latter about the former's willingness to pay. Similarly, the
Borrower uses the initial offer of the Creditor to infer something about subsequent offers, and
on the basis of that inference decides whether to accept the initial offer or to wait.

As we shall

see, even within this simplified structure we can derive important insights.

2.

MODELLING DEBT RENEGOTIATION AS A SEQUENTIAL
BARGAINING PROCESS
At the outset, it is important for us to identify the item being bargained over by the

parties. This is the loan which the Creditor has already extended to the Borrower; and the
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parties are bargaining over the (new set of) terms at which the loan is to be repaid. We assume
that both sides expect positive gains from reaching agreement.
If no agreement is reached, we have a situation in which the Creditor can declare a
default. The outcome of this declaration is that default penalties are invoked against the
Borrower.These include the exclusion of the Borrower from credit facilities; his exclusion from
the international payments system, with consequent difficulties in conducting international
trade; and varying forms of trade embargo.2 The Creditor may be able to seize some of the
Borrower's assets which are held overseas, but these are typically of relatively insignificant
amounts compared to the total debt outstanding. Moreover, there are no direct gains to the
Creditor apart from these. The penalties imposed on the Borrower do not on the whole
translate into direct benefits for the Creditor. Declaring a default will therefore not normally be
in the Creditor's interest, although in the event of outright (explicit) debt repudiation by a
Borrower, Creditors would find it in their

interest to invoke default penalties, if only for the

deterrent effects such an action would have on other would-be defaulters.
The cost of default to the Borrower will depend very much on how dependent on trade
his economy is. The more open the Borrower's economy, and the more dependent on
international trade it is, the more costly a default is likely to be. In the context of the current
international economy, where a significant proportion of countries' national incomes derives
from international trade, the cost of forced economic autarky is likely to be extremely high for
the vast majority of countries. The inescapable conclusion is that not reaching agreement, or
refusing to do so, is an irrational course of action for the Borrower as well.
In the situation we are modelling, the Borrower's knowledge (or lack of it) about the
Creditor is not particularly relevant.

The Creditors will typically refuse to consider

rescheduling a loan unless the Borrower is in a state of "imminent default" - that is, unless they
are convinced that the reason for the difficulty is an inability to pay on the Borrower's part.3
There is no other reason for the Creditor to modify the terms of the original loan.
The fact that the Creditors are able to specify the preconditions under which they are
prepared to contemplate renegotiating the loan indicates that they hold some advantage over the
Borrower in this situation. The Creditors are able to initiate a renegotiation simply by cutting off
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ongoing sources of funds to the Borrower. Under these circumstances, the Borrower has little
choice but to request a renegotiation subject to the Creditors' preconditions, the main one being
that the Borrower satisfy the Creditors of his inability to pay. The fact that the Creditors are
able, via the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to impose conditions on the Borrower as part
of the terms of the renegotiated loan lends further support to our interpretation that the Creditors
exercise some power over the Borrower.
Once a loan is in arrears, the value of it to the Creditors is zero. This is because the loan
has already been extended and, for that reason, there is no other party which the Creditors can
offer it to .4

This fact is common knowledge. Nonetheless, the Creditors hold contractual

rights to the face value of the loan, and those rights count for something in a world of infinitelylived (or close to it) institutional and country agents, however one may argue that those rights
are directly unenforceable. The Creditors can make things very uncomfortable for the Borrower
if he does not observe the original contract terms (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a, Appendix). If,
after the Borrower has demonstrated his inability to meet the original contract terms, the
Creditors insist on receiving the contractual payments, this amounts to their making a take-it-orleave-it offer. But since few direct benefits accrue to them from imposing default penalties (as
we pointed out earlier), this course of action is not rational or, for that reason, credible.
Because of their contractual rights, however, the Creditors will be able to press for a
renegotiated payment amount as close to the face value as they can possibly obtain from the
Borrower. This amount depends on the Borrowers' ability to pay, while the face value of the
loan represents the maximum claim the Creditors are likely to make. In view of the above, we
model the debt renegotiation situation as a game of one-sided incomplete information, where the
Creditor has imperfect knowledge about the Borrower's ability or willingness to service his
loan, while the Borrower is fully informed about the Creditor's valuation of the loan. In this
game, only the Creditor makes the offers, while the Borrower responds to the offers by either
accepting or rejecting the terms proposed. This assumption captures to some extent the
Creditor's advantage over the Borrower. This is because, just as there is a first-mover
advantage to the party making the initial offer in a game where both parties make offers
(Rubinstein, 1982), bestowing on one party a greater frequency of opportunities to make offers
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allows him to appropriate a larger share of the benefits from bargaining (see, for example,
Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a).
We then solve for the unique stationary perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

3.

THE MODEL
The model is an infinite-horizon one, and is a special case, after Fudenberg, Levine and

Ruud (1983), of the Sobel and Takahashi (1983) model. There are two parties, a Borrower and
a Creditor. For various reasons, the Borrower has suspended debt service payments on his
loans, and has requested a renegotiation of his contract on more favourable terms. The Creditor
therefore makes offers based on the information available to him about the Borrower's ability to
service his loan. The Borrower's role in this model is passive in the sense that he responds only
by accepting or rejecting the offers made by the Creditor.
The purpose of the model is to examine the equilibrium time path of offers by the
Creditor, and to see what that time path depends on. We also examine the role of information in
reaching agreement. The driving force which encourages an agreement to be reached here is the
parties' impatience to do so. The parties to the renegotiation will be concerned about reaching
agreement on a number of key variables, namely, the new maturity profile of the loan, the
interest payments on it, and the timing of those payments. Each stream of cash flows will be
discounted at the relevant discount rate by each party to obtain a certain value, which is that
party's valuation of that particular stream of cash flows. Each stream of cash flows will
obviously be valued differently by the parties because in general they will have different
discount rates. For convenience, we refer to the discounted value from only the Creditor's point
of view in our discussion of the model; but the reader should bear in mind that they refer to
different streams of cash flows over various time horizons, and that they will be valued
differently by the Borrower.
Let t = 0 represent the start of bargaining, and let the Creditor's offer to the Borrower at
time t be denoted X t. This represents the Creditor's valuation of the stream of cash flows he is
suggesting the Borrower should adopt as his new payments schedule.5 The Borrower is able
to pay an amount B which is known to him, but unknown to the Creditor. The Creditor's
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reservation value of the loan is zero, and we assume that this is common knowledge. The zero
valuation assumption simply reflects the fact that the loan has already been made and the
Creditor cannot bargain with any other Borrower. Without loss of generality, we can take it that
B > 0, since otherwise the Borrower would choose not to participate in the renegotiation.6

In

other words, the parties start off with the common knowledge that there are mutual positive
gains from reaching agreement.
Delay in reaching agreement is costly to the parties, since they both have positive rates
of time preference. The Borrower's rate of time preference, ps, is assumed to be common
knowledge. In practice, p s will be related to factors such as the openness of his economy (see
Gasiorowski, 1985) and the size of his stock of foreign exchange reserves - in other words, it
will be related to the vulnerability of the Borrower's economy to external pressure. The
Creditor's rate of time preference, pc, is also assumed to be common knowledge. It will be
directly related to the interest rates determined by market forces, which reflect their opportunity
cost of funds. A direct implication of this is that higher world interest rates, via their effect on
his rate of time preference, puts the Creditor in a weaker bargaining position compared to
before the increase in interest rates, since it makes him more impatient to reach a settlement. The
Borrower and the Creditor both seek to maximise their respective payoffs from arriving at an
agreement.
At each stage (t) of the game the Creditor makes an offer X t which the Borrower may
accept or reject. If the Borrower accepts the Creditor's offer, then his payoff is
exp(-pBt) [B - Xt],

while the Creditor's payoff is

exp {-pct)Xt.

If the Borrower rejects Xt at time t then, after a time lag of 5, the Creditor makes another offer
X /+«5 . As we shall see, the Creditor's offers will decline with time, and so the Borrower is
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presented with a well-behaved choice criterion in which the potentially increasing term (B - Xt)
is being discounted by the term exp(-pBt).
The time lag

8

is an important part of the analytic apparatus of this model. It is

determined by institutional and other factors. For example, a large number of London Club
creditors from different geographical regions may mean that each time an offer is rejected by the
Borrower a significant time lag may be necessary before the next offer is made in order, first,
for this fact to be communicated to all the creditors and, second, for a new set of offer terms to
be formulated and agreed on. The time lag 8 may also be interpreted as the Creditor's ability to
commit himself since, once he makes an offer, he has to stand by it for the length of time
represented by 8 . If 8 =

then the Creditor makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. As we have

argued earlier, such an offer is not credible, and we assume here that
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is strictly finite.

Moreover, for simplicity, we assume that 8 is a constant.
The Creditor does not know the value B that the Borrower is able to pay, but has the
following cumulative density function defined over it:7
B < 0
0 < B <B

(1)

B >B

for A > 0. Equation (1) says that, in the Creditor's view, the lower bound of the range of
possible values of B is zero, and the upper bound of this range is B. The probability to the
Creditor that the Borrower's valuation of the loan takes a value B within this range is some
power A of the ratio (B/B). Since the parties are here bargaining over the amount of debt relief
the Borrower is to receive, we can reasonably assume that the largest conceivable value B can
take is represented by the original face value of the loan. Depending on the information
available to the Creditor, however, it may well be less.
What factors determine B1 We argue that it reflects the Borrower's willingness to pay,
which in turn depends on his ability to pay. It also will reflect the cost to the Borrower of
agreeing to IMF conditionality, the terms of which he will already be aware of by the start of
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bargaining.8 This will reflect in turn the size of any outstanding debt the Borrower has, since
this will affect his incentives.
On the Creditor's side, notice that when X is "large" the density clusters around the
upper end of the range, and that when it is "small" the density clusters around the lower end of
the range. The variable X may therefore be interpreted as reflecting the Creditor's degree of
optimism regarding how much of the value of the loan he can recover from the Borrower.
Among other things, X will depend on the bargaining strength of the parties with respect to each
other. If the Borrower is "small" and the loan represents an insignificant proportion of the
Creditor's portfolio, the latter can afford to adopt a tougher bargaining position. In this case, X
would be correspondingly larger. The variable X would also reflect the information available to
the Creditor regarding the Borrower's ability to pay.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium can then be defined as a set of beliefs for the Creditor
and a pair of strategies which satisfy the following conditions. First, the Creditor's beliefs
about B should be updated (according to Bayes' rule) to take account of new information at
each stage of the bargaining. Second, for each value of B, the Borrower's chosen strategy
should be the best response to the strategy of the Creditor, and the Creditor's strategy should be
optimal given both the Borrower's strategy and the Creditor's beliefs about B.
The Creditor's strategy will be to make offers, X t, each period as a function of his
previous offers. The Borrower's strategy determines for him, given B, which offers should be
accepted, also as a function of previous offers. We assume that each player believes that his
opponent will optimise in the future regardless of what has happened in the past (the
equilibrium is then "subgame perfect"). This assumption is not innocuous: it rules out empty
threats. In particular, it prohibits one potentially useful strategy: that is, the Creditor cannot
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer in the first period. Because it is common knowledge that gains
from agreement are available to both parties, it is in the Creditor's interest to continue
bargaining towards an agreement, and therefore he cannot credibly commit to walking away
from the bargaining table if his offer is rejected. This assumption seems to be consistent with
what actually happens in practice.
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We can now solve for the (unique) stationary reserve price equilibrium under the
Bayesian updating procedure. The Borrower chooses a function X(») and accepts the first offer
which meets the criterion X t <X(B). That is, the function X(B) generates a value (which we
would, in equilibrium, expect a priori to be some fraction

77 of B)\

this is the maximum amount

the Borrower is willing to pay to the Creditor (it is his reservation value) given their rates of
time preference. A result quoted in Fudenberg, Levine and Ruud (1983) cites that (in a different
context) the function X(B) is strictly increasing in B. This result is intuitively reasonable: we
can interpret it as saying that the greater the extent to which the Borrower is able to pay, the
greater the amount he will be willing to pay the Creditor, given their respective rates of time
preference. Then, given B, the first offer which equals or falls below this maximum amount is
accepted.
The bargaining has started. The Creditor's prior beliefs about B are that it lies in the
range [0, £]. If a settlement has not been reached and the lowest offer made so far is X t, then
the Creditor will be able to use this information to upgrade his knowledge in the following way.
Given the criterion for agreement, and given that the last rejected offer was X t, the Creditor is
able to infer that X t, ^ X(5), and hence that X_1(Xt) > B. In other words, if he knew the
function X(»), he would use the value X t in the inverse of it, and solve backwards to obtain
the implied maximum value of B. The assumption here is that the Creditor knows what the
function X(») is.9 Given that, his posterior density can be derived as

f0
F(BjXt) = I (B/X-1 (X))*

ll

B < 0
0 < B < X ' H X t)

(2)

B > X ' 1 (Xt)

So, while his lower limit (zero) remains unchanged, his upper limit is now .^ (X /),

where

B > X 'l(X t), and so the range of his beliefs about B has narrowed. His knowledge about the
value of B has been improved as a direct result of the bidding process.
Notice that the range [0, B ] can be interpreted as reflecting the Creditor's state of
knowledge, or his degree of uncertainty, about the Borrower's ability to pay. The more
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informed (less uncertain) the Creditor is about the Borrower’s ability to pay, the narrower will
be the range and the more quickly, other things equal, will agreement be reached.
We can now define more closely the concept of a stationary equilibrium. If the Creditor
found it optimal to offer X q when he had the prior density F(B), he now finds it optimal to
offer

[ x - l ( X t)/B] X 0

(3)

when his previous lowest offer is X t. Since X 'l (Xt) <B (it makes no sense for him to offer
more than X(B)) this just means that his offer will now be a fraction of the initial offer Xo. In
other words, the move from the prior density to the posterior is simply a rescaling of his beliefs
about the Borrower's reservation value of the loan B to a new scale B = [X-1 (Xt)/B]B. This is
the merit of the functional form chosen here: updating simply changes the scale. As the size of
the offers declines, so the density accumulates about a smaller range of possible values of B.
Since each offer made by the Creditor on the equilibrium "concession schedule" is obviously
going to be less than the previous one, the bidding function can be expressed as:

x t+8 = yX ,

(4)

for some 0 < y< 1 , which is constant over time under the assumption of stationarity, and where
8 is the length of the bargaining period (the length of time between offers).
We now consider the Borrower's optimal strategy. If the Borrower accepts X t, his gain
from negotiation is [B - X t]. If the Borrower waits one period, he receives exp(-p£<5)
[B - yX t], given the discounting function of his payoff. Indifference between these two terms
provides the intertemporal reservation value function X(B), which occurs at the value of Xt that
makes the Borrower indifferent between the two. This yields

X(B) = r\B,

(5)
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where

1
r\

=

- exp(-pBS)

--------------------------------------- ---—

1

- yexp(-pB S)

.

This tells us that the amount which the Borrower will be willing to pay the Creditor depends on
his (the Borrower's) impatience to reach an agreement as well as on how quickly the Creditor
reduces the size of his offers. Notice that the Borrower yields less (77 is smaller) as the Creditor
concedes more (yis smaller). And if the cost of waiting increases (ps or 8 rise) then the value
of 77 rises and the Borrower becomes more conciliatory.
Now we can find the optimal strategy for the Creditor (the value of y). Let us take t| as
given and suppose that the Borrower rejected an offer of X t.§ the previous period. If the
Creditor next offers yX t.§, this offer is rejected with the probability F(Xt.s)/F(yXt.s) = y \
using the density assumed earlier. Define Uc as the expected value to the Creditor from
offering .Xf. The offer X t = y X t_§ is accepted with probability 1 - yK Imposing stationarity
then means the Creditor obtains yUc in the next period with probability

7

^ if the Borrower

rejects Xt.
So the expected value for the Creditor under stationary conditions is

Uc = (1 - y x) yXt-8 + y x exp(-pc 8) yU c

or, after collecting terms,

u c = (i - r A) yXt-s

[i - y 1+A exp(-pc S)]-1

(6)

where p c is the Creditor's rate of time preference. Differentiating this last expression with
respect to 7, we find the first-order condition for a maximum of Uc to be

exp (-pc 8) X y + y ^ = l + X

(7)
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This has a unique solution for y in the interval (0, 1). This may be seen by letting y go
first to zero and then to one. As /approaches zero, the left-hand-side of (7) goes to infinity;
with y= 1 the left-hand-side is less than the right-hand-side of the expression. This tells us that
the solution for ylies strictly between zero and one. Differentiating (7) with respect to y, we
obtain X (e'Pc®- y 1'*) which is negative (making use of our earlier finding regarding the
bounds for y), thus confirming that the solution is also unique. Further, since the second-order
condition for a maximum is satisfied, the solution for y(call it P) is an optimum.
Despite the nonlinearity of the expression for P we can consider its marginal responses
to changes in the parameters of the expression. Inspection of the first derivative of (7) shows
that a rise in p c or 6, which represents increases in the cost of delay to the Creditor, reduces P
and so implies that the Creditor concedes more rapidly. An increase in X increases P and
lowers the concession speed. This result is reasonable: a rise in X means the density F(»)
accumulates at its upper value of B. Since even a minor concession on the part of the Creditor
will cause the Borrower to accept the offer, there is no reason for the Creditor to concede
swiftly. Intuitively, since the Creditor's degree of optimism (reflected by X) regarding the
amount he can recover from the Borrower is "higher", he will tend to make smaller concessions
each time.
Now it remains for us to determine the appropriate level of the initial offer. Any rejected
offer X t.$ implies that T)B <Xt.g, and the next chosen offer for debt relief will be X t = VXt.s.
The initial guess about B cannot place it above B, and stationarity implies that the first offer
should be Xo = Pr\B. The concession schedule from there becomes

X t = Vr\BVtlS

(8)

when offers are made after each interval S. This function represents the unique stationary
perfect Bayesian reservation price equilibrium.
We have ignored the nonstationary equilibria, which may yield higher returns to one
side or the other, such equilibria make the time path dependent on the starting date and the entire
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sequence of associated information rather than just the data relevant to a move from any one
time period to an adjacent one. Further, nonstationarity implies that the probability of the
bargaining persisting another "round" depends on the length of the period between offers being
made. This prevents a closed-form solution for the model, although simulation may be used to
study special cases.

4.

EVALUATING THE OUTCOMES
The model presented in this paper offers a number of insights and suggestions on

addressing some relevant issues in international debt. First, the model establishes the existence
of an equilibrium, which is unique, under the assumption of stationarity. This equilibrium
depends on a number of key parameters associated with the bargainers' time preferences and
views of the world (the Creditor's optimism regarding the Borrower's ability to service his
debt), as well as established data (e.g., publicly-available information on the Borrower's
financial position).
Second, the equilibrium supports the model structure where only one side of the
bargaining process has full information. Under this model structure, the Borrower has little
incentive to reveal the level of B to the Creditor. The information incompleteness is the source
of delay in reaching agreement in this model, and this, together with the lack of incentives for
the Borrower to reveal his valuation, implies a need for an external party which is able to
provide the required information, in order to reduce the level of uncertainty around the
Borrower's economic state of affairs. This is in part the function fulfilled by the IMF when a
standby agreement is reached with the Borrower.
Some of the observations we made earlier also have interesting implications.
Equation (5), for example, suggests that, if it is in the Creditor's power to increase the
Borrower's cost of waiting (pB), it would be in his interest to do so. We know in fact that it is
within the power of bank creditors to do just that. Simply by cutting off access to further credit
and forcing the Borrower to draw down on his stock of reserves means that the more reliant on
international trade the Borrower's economy is, the more subject to such pressure he will be.
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Further, denying access to the international payments system means that the Borrower has to
resort to alternative means of payment (such as counter-trade, or barter, for example), and
imposes additional costs on the Borrower.
Looking beyond the model, it suggests possible reasons why London Club negotiations
are so much more protracted than Paris Club ones. 10 The parameter 8, representing the time
lag between successive rounds of bargaining, can be interpreted as, inter alia, reflecting delays
by the Creditors in framing a new set of offer terms when the previous set of terms is rejected
by the Borrower. Because London Club creditors tend to vastly outnumber Paris Club ones,
the coordination problems in the former group are correspondingly greater. Although these
problems are mitigated to some extent by the (comparatively recent) commercial-bank practice
of coordinating operations through steering committees, there is still the problem of
communicating decisions to all the individual creditor banks involved. While the model does
not explicitly address the issue of coordination, the obvious conclusion is that better
coordination among creditors who comprise the lending syndicate as a whole would reduce the
time taken to reach agreement. In the context of the model, this occurs via a reduction in 8.

5.

CONCLUSION
The contribution of this paper is the application of a model which allows a dual focus on

aspects of the debt renegotiation situation. First, the model allows a focus on the reasons for
delays in reaching agreement, highlighting the important role played by information in reducing
the time taken by the parties to reach agreement. The degree of uncertainty as reflected in the
range (0, B) is reduced as more preliminary information is made available to the Creditor. As a
direct result, given the parameters of the model, the time taken to reach agreement will be
reduced. Since the Borrower has no incentive to reveal his private information, an external
party which is able to provide the information would speed up the bargaining process. Recent
developments, in particular the formation of the Institute of International Finance in 1983,
support the relevance of this result. That organisation was formed to provide its commercial-
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bank members with information corresponding to that provided to the multilaterial institutions
on a confident basis (Surrey and Nash, 19840.
Second, the model allows a focus on the acutal process of renegotion, highlighting the
choices faced by the factors influencing the parties at each step of the bargaining. This
contrasts with the instantaneous arrival at agreement by complete information models (eg.
Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a) which, while valuable, lack this particular dimension.
Therefore, while the findings of the model may not be novel in a purely theoretical
sense, the application of it to the debt renegotiation situation lends a further dimension to our
understanding of the problem.
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ENDNOTES
An early version of this paper appeared as a National Bureau of Economic Research
working paper in December 1986.
See the Appendix to Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) for estimates of the costs of trade
disruptions for some Latin American Countries.
See Rieffel (1985). Another reason why the Creditors do not approach the Borrower
for a renegotiaton may be because doing so would place them at a disadvantage right
from the start: they would implicitly be accepting the premise that the Borrower actually
does need a softening of terms, rather than requiring the Borrower to prove his need.
This ignores the secondary market in bank loans, which is generally very thin in any
case, so that prices quoted on it cannot be taken as good indicators of what the Creditor
banks would be able to obtain for their loans (Fischer 1989). The fact that a loan
syndicate in the process of renegotiating the loan contract was seeking to sell off
portions of that loan would very likely be taken as a bad sign, forcing the price of the
loan towards zero.
In actual bargaining, what the Creditor puts forward as his offer will be a suggested
stream of cash flows which the Borrower then puts a value on.
Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985) discuss the case of a buyer and a seller, with a
model structure similar to ours: the seller makes all the offers and has incomplete
information about the buyer's valuation; and the parties' discount factors and the
seller's production cost are common knowledge. They show that if it is common
knowledge that the buyer's valuation strictly exceeds the seller's, then not only does an
equilibrium exist, but it is also unique.
While this is an arbitrary functional form, it is flexible enough to accommodate a
considerable range of alternative densities if necessary to model the outcomes of
empirical work (Fudenberg, Levine and Ruud, 1983).
This is because the most fundamental precondition for a rescheduling, in either the Paris
Club or the London Club, is that the Borrower must have concluded a "standby
agreement" with the IMF covering the period for which debt relief is requested. This is
an agreement which assures the Borrower (who must be a member of the IMF) that he
may draw on IMF resources up to a specified amount during a given period without
further review of its economic policies, provided he has observed the conditions and
other terms of the agreement. If the conditions are not observed, the Borrower's access
to further credit is interrupted.
This in turn rests on our assumption that the Borrower's rate of time preference is
known to the Creditor (see Equation (5)). Since T| is a function of both the Borrower's
rate of time preference as well as y, the rate at which the Creditor makes concessions,
and the latter is known to the Creditor, the common knowledge assumption of the
parties' rates of time preference turns out to be crucial.
While Paris Club negotiations are usually concluded within thirty-six hours (Rieffel,
1985), London Club ones may take more than a year to reach agreement (Park and
Zwick, 1985).
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